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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that while objectives as well as procedures and institutions 
concerning merger decisions in the US and the EU differ, in practice merger decisions 
regarding companies operating in both jurisdictions are typically mirrored on each side of 
the Atlantic. The overruling by the European Commission of the GE-Honeywell merger, 
which had already been approved in the US, was an exception. We draw the following 
lessons for US firms seeking a merger involving the EU: 1) when preparing a merger 
proposal in the US, merging firms may be well advised to consult simultaneously with 
EU authorities to avoid unpleasant surprises in the future; 2) US firms may be advised to 
cooperate very closely with the Commission given the latter’s substantial decision-
making power. In contrast to merger decisions in the US, which uses an adversarial legal 
approach to merger decisions, the European Commission initiates, investigates and 
decides merger cases. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
may be subjected to more oversight than the European Commission. However, recent 
developments in the EU indicate that this difference may have become diminished. The 
annulment by the European Court of First Instance of the Commission’s prohibition 
decision regarding the Schneider-Legrand and Tetra Laval-Sidel mergers could indicate 
that in the near future DG Competition will find it more difficult to say no; 3) US firms 
should be careful when lobbying in Brussels. The more aggressive lobby-style in the US 
comes across as less persuasive in Brussels. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July 2001, the European Commission struck a deadly blow to the proposed 
acquisition of Honeywell International Inc., an aerospace giant, by General Electric Co. 
(GE). The proposed $45 billion takeover of Honeywell was to be the world's largest 
industrial merger ever.  Despite winning approval from the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in the US, the European Commission ruled that a merged GE-Honeywell would be 
harmful to competition. Journalists and business analysts were quick to interpret the 
divergent conclusions by the EU and US authorities as an illustration that profound 
differences on this issue exist on each side of the Atlantic. This conclusion is premature. 
While there are clearly differences between US and EU objectives and procedures, in 
practice merger decisions regarding companies operating in both jurisdictions are 
typically mirrored on each side of the Atlantic. 
We argue that while EU competition law is driven by the goal of unifying the 
European market and maintaining a level playing field for competitors, the US merger 
review focuses of the issue of consumer benefit. Nonetheless, empirical data from twelve 
years of merger reviews show that EU and US merger decisions are quite similar 
regardless of the different objectives and procedures. This article also shows that the EU 
and US consider similar economic issues when analyzing mergers. For instance, both 
examine the tradeoff between dominance and efficiency.  The EU and US antitrust 
authorities share the belief that increased competition increases efficiency, and that these 
efficiencies in turn benefit consumers. The main difference is that in contrast to their US 
counterparts, EU authorities are more concerned about the danger of possible abuse of 
dominant position relative to potential consumer benefits. 
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The aim of this article is to elucidate audiences about differences between US and 
EU antitrust authorities in their objectives and procedures. Our main argument is that 
different procedures and institutional structures in certain (rare) cases may intensify 
divergent objectives of the EU and US merger authorities and override otherwise similar 
economic tests. Rather than perceiving European antitrust regulation as a “stumbling 
block on the road toward a more integrated global economy,”1 a better understanding of 
both American and European antitrust principles will foster greater cooperation and 
reduce the risk of surprise merger decisions. 
This article proceeds with a general discussion of European and American 
antitrust law, followed by an overview of the different objectives and procedures. We 
then discuss the economic objectives and tools used by each antitrust authority and how 
these methods affect their decisions. Although the GE-Honeywell case was an example 
of a vertical mergers between companies in dissimilar industries, our discussion focuses 
mainly on horizontal mergers between companies in similar industries. The latter are 
more typical. Finally, we review current issues and how they may encourage greater 
convergence between US and EU merger review in the future. 
 
 
 
II. EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
                                                 
1 David S. Evans. “The New Trustbusters: Brussels and Washington May Part Ways,” Foreign Affairs, 
81(1), 2002: 14. 
 
Page 4 
 
European competition law is embodied in Articles 81-82 and Articles 87-89 of the 
European Community (EC) Treaty.2 Articles 81 and 82 establish the most important 
competition rules in EU law. Article 81 prohibits concerted practices among firms to 
distort competition, unless these practices can be shown to have overriding benefits to the 
Community. Article 82 aims to prevent firms with a dominant position from practicing 
behavior that is detrimental to the interests of the common market. Articles 87-89 codify 
rules regarding member states’ distribution of national subsidies, called “state aid,” and 
do not pertain directly to mergers.   
Although Articles 81 and 82 speak to collusion and market dominance, the 1957 
Treaty specifies neither the rules nor the evaluation process regarding merger regulation. 
In fact, competition laws in general lacked strong enforcement until the momentum of 
European integration took hold in the late 1980s. The passage of the Single European Act 
in 1987 began the movement towards creating a single market in good, services, capital, 
and people by January 1, 1993. In 1989 the EU implemented the Merger Control 
Regulation, which today serves as the guideline for merger review. The 1989 Regulation 
also established the European Merger Task Force (MTF) as a separate unit within the 
Directorate General for Competition, whose role is to evaluate proposed mergers (called 
“concentrations” under EU law) and decide whether these actions are compatible with 
European competition.3  
                                                 
2 Originally called the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty (1957), the EC Treaty was renamed 
by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1998, which also renumbered these Articles. 
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3 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker. The Economics or EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999: 1-10. 
The goals of European competition law are twofold.4 The primary goal of all 
European law is market integration of the Community. Consequently, the Commission is 
especially harsh towards commercial behavior that it believes hinders cross-border trade 
within Europe. The second objective of European competition rules is sustaining 
competition within the Community. Article 81 and Article 82 and the European Merger 
Regulation include language focused on prohibiting firms from strengthening or creating 
a dominant position. Article 2 (3) of the Merger Control Regulation states that “A 
concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market.”5 
  Many American scholars have emphasized the phrase “dominant power” in 
Article 82 to emphasize the ostensible difficulty in rendering a positive EU decision in 
cases of mergers between market leaders. However, the interpretation of competition law 
by Commission officials is not as loose as the reading by American observers. That is, 
European merger officials are more concerned with the abuse of dominance, rather than 
simply market dominance. The abuse of dominant position is defined by the disruption of 
competition, which is similar to US merger guidelines. “[T]he same economic principles 
are as valid in the application of E.C. competition law as in the application of competition 
law in other jurisdictions, including the United States.”6 
 The European Merger Regulation gives the MTF, a division of the Directorate-
General for Competition of the European Commission, the authority to review mergers, 
                                                 
4 Ibid, Chapter 1. 
5 Article 2 (3), Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings. 
6 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker. The Economics or EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999: 5. 
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acquisitions, and proposed takeovers involving firms of significance to the common 
market. Specifically, mergers exceeding the following thresholds must be notified to the 
MTF within DG Competition: 1) parties with an aggregate worldwide turnover of more 
than €5 billion (approximately US$5 billion at the time of writing), 2) each of at least two 
of the parties with an aggregate EU-wide turnover of more than €250 billion 
(approximately US$250 billion at the time of writing), and 3) at least one party with more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide turnover within one member state.  
The MTF decision procedure is a two-stage process. Phase I involves the 
preliminary analysis of the merger, which must be completed in four weeks. In 
conducting its investigation, the MTF may draw upon the input of other offices within 
DG Competition and even other Directorates General for their industry expertise. The 
MTF also solicits comments from “all interested parties,” including competitors and 
customers. The merger investigation begins by assessing whether the merger falls under 
the scope of regulation, whether the merger is compatible with the common market, and 
whether it strengthens a dominant position.7  
After conducting its investigation, the MTF draws up a preliminary draft report, 
which is submitted to a so-called Advisory Committee on Concentrations. Once the 
Committee has reviewed the report and made its opinion, a draft decision is sent to the 
twenty members of the College of Commissioners at the Commission for decision. 
Decisions are then taken by simple majority voting (Article 8 in the Rules of Procedure 
for the Commission 8 December 2000). During Phase 1 the Commission may decide that 
1) the merger is outside the scope of merger control, 2) it is compatible with competition, 
                                                 
7 Michelle Cini and Lee McGowan. Competition Policy in the European Union. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998: 121. 
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3) it is compatible with stipulated commitments, or 4) it should be referred to member 
states for judgment. Over 95% of mergers are settled through Phase I procedures.  
Alternatively, the Commission may have doubts about the compatibility of the 
merger with the common market. In this situation, the Commission will proceed to a 
second, more detailed, investigation in Phase 2. Article 8 of the Merger Control 
Regulation specifies that the Commission must conduct the Phase 2 investigation within a 
four-month period. If a conditional or negative decision is likely to be reached, the 
Commission issues a formal Statement of Objections prior to the decision. This 
Statement presents the Commission’s arguments against the merger and gives the 
merging parties two weeks to respond. At the end of Phase 2, the Commission’s decision 
will be one of the following outcomes: 1) the concentration is cleared without conditions; 
2) the concentration is approved if the merging companies meet certain conditions; or 3) 
the concentration is prohibited. All merger decisions must be made no later than five 
months after notification. The parties have a right to appeal all Commission decisions to 
the Court of First Instance.8 
 As the data in Figure 1 show, the European Commission approves most of the 
mergers, which it reviews. Since 1990, the Commission has rejected only eighteen 
proposed mergers, i.e., less than 1% of the notified cases. The prohibition of the merger 
between GE and Honeywell marked only the fifteenth time in eleven years that the 
European Commission had blocked a merger and only the second time that the European 
                                                 
8Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin. EC Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001: 715 
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Commission has prohibited a merger involving at least one US company. The other such 
case was the proposed merger between MCI WorldCom and Sprint.9 
 
Figure 1 
European Merger Control Statistics 
21 September 1990 to 31 October 2002 
  
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
Cumulative 
Total 
Notifications               
  Number of notified  
  cases 
 
12 
 
63 
 
60 
 
58 
 
95 
 
110 
 
131 
 
172 
 
235 
 
292 
 
345 
 
335 
 
215 
 
2,123 
  Cases withdrawn, 
  Phase 1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
4 
 
5 
 
9 
 
5 
 
7 
 
8 
 
8 
 
3 
 
59 
  Cases withdrawn,  
  Phase 2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
4 
 
0 
 
21 
               
Final Decisions               
Phase 1               
  Out of Scope 2 5 9 4 5 9 6 4 6 1 1 1 0 53 
  Compatible 5 47 43 49 78 90 109 118 207 236 293 299 202 1,776 
  Compatible with  
  commitments 
 
0 
 
3 
 
4 
 
0 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0 
 
2 
 
12 
 
19 
 
28 
 
13 
 
8 
 
94 
  Referral to Member 
  States 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
3 
 
7 
 
4 
 
4 
 
6 
 
7 
 
9 
 
43 
               
Phase 2               
  Referral to Member 
  States 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
  Compatible 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 0 3 5 2 22 
  Compatible with  
  Commitments 
 
0 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
7 
 
4 
 
8 
 
12 
 
10 
 
4 
 
61 
  Prohibition1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 5 0 18 
  Restore Effective  
  Competition 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
4 
               
Total Final Decisions 7 60 61 57 91 109 125 142 238 270 345 340 227 2,072 
 
 
1”Prohibition” is a rejection decision. 
 
Source: Directorate General Competition, European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/stats.html, 31     
October 2002. 
 
 
 
Page 9 
 
                                                 
9 Interview with Ms. Maria-Blanca Rodriguez-Galindo, representative from DG Competition, 4 November 
2002. 
Figure 1 also shows the explosive growth in the number of cases coming before 
the European Commission under merger control between 1996 and 2001.  This marked 
increase coincides with the growing consolidation of businesses globally during this 
period. The decline over the past two years also reflects the slowdown in mergers caused 
in part by the slump in the global economy.  
In summary, the data show that the Commission approves most mergers that are 
notified to the MTF. The year 2001 exhibited a peak of rejection decisions with five 
prohibited cases out of 227 total final decisions. 
 
III. US ANTITRUST LAW 
The following sections argue that EU competition law and US antitrust law are 
based on the same basic economic principles. However, this fact might seem almost 
serendipitous considering the different history that has produced these contrasting bodies 
of law. The US has a longer history of antitrust enforcement, beginning with the Sherman 
Act (1890), the Clayton Act (1914), and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914). The 
Sherman Act forbids cartels (Section 1) and prohibits monopolies that engage in 
anticompetitive acts (Section 2). The Clayton Act prohibits all types of price 
discrimination (Section 2), the use of tie-ins (Section 3), and mergers (Section 7) that 
reduce competition, as well as interrelated directorates among competing firms (Section 
8).10 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forms the basis of US rules regarding monopolistic 
conduct. Market power is assessed with respect to a specifically defined market. 
However, simply possessing size or market power alone is not illegal. The firm in 
                                                 
10 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization, Third Edition. New York: 
Addison-Wesley, 2000: 602-3. 
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question must also have engaged in anticompetitive behavior. That is, some monopolies 
will avoid censure because their power is a consequence of their success in the market.  
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 modified the merger review process in the 
United States. The Act stipulates that all large proposed mergers must be notified to both 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
(DoJ). Prior to the passage of Hart-Scott-Rodino, many horizontal merger cases were 
decided through the court system and many came before the US Supreme Court.  
Once a proposed merger case is submitted for review, either the FTC or DoJ 
assumes responsibility for assessing its effects on market competition.11 While both 
institutions have jurisdiction over merger review in most industries, each agency has 
developed expertise in specific industries. For instance, the FTC devotes itself to markets 
where consumer spending is high. Such markets include healthcare, food, energy, and 
high technology industries. The Justice Department has sole antitrust jurisdiction in cases 
subject to industry regulation by other agencies. Such instances include 
telecommunications, airlines, and rail.12  
In 1992, The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the DoJ and the FTC further 
defined the merger review process in the US. The Merger Guidelines outline the 
principles that the US government uses to analyze the effects of mergers on the market.13 
The size-of-transaction threshold is $50 million.14 This contrasts with higher threshold in 
                                                 
11W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 
Third Edition. Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000: 208-9. 
12 Federal Trade Commission. “Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain English Guide to 
Antitrust Laws.” www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/index.htm. 
13 See Section 1.5 “Concentration and Market Shares”, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, (www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/15.html). 
14 According to the Federal Trade Commission Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal 
Year 2001, legislation in 2001 raised the threshold from $15 million to $50 million. (Section 630 of the 
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Europe, where the combined entity must be at least €250 billion in revenue (equaling 
$250 billion at the time of writing) or one of the parties must have at least €5 in revenue 
(equaling $5 billion at the time of writing).  
Similar to the procedures at the European Commission, US agencies apply a two-
step “premerger notification” process as outlined in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. After 
reporting the planned merger to the FTC and Antitrust Division of the DoJ, the parties 
wait for 30 days before they may complete the transaction.15 If either agency determines 
that further inquiry is necessary, it may issue a “second request.” The second request 
process mirrors the Phase 2 period of the merger investigation in the EU. During the 
second request, the waiting period for the merging parties is extended (typically to 30 
more days). If the agency reviewing the merger believes that the proposed merger may 
substantially lessen competition, it may request an injunction in federal district court to 
prohibit the merger.16  
The first step that the agencies undertake in reviewing a proposed merger is to 
define the relevant market. The Merger Guidelines identify a market to be the smallest 
group of products in the smallest geographical area such that a hypothetical monopoly 
could raise price by a certain amount above current or future levels.  
The second step in the merger review process is to determine if the proposed 
merger will greatly increase concentration, and therefore, market power. The government 
typically employs the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market 
                                                                                                                                                 
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY 
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762. 
15 The period is only 15 days in cases of cash tender offers of bankruptcy sales (Federal Trade Commission 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2001: 3, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsr.htm). 
 
16 Ibid, 3-4. 
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concentration. The Commission also uses the HHI technique to assess competitive effects 
of mergers and, like the US authorities, is not legally bound to do so. The HHI is the sum 
of the squared market shares of the players in the industry. A merger raises concerns 
when the HHI is over 1800 and the change in the HHI is over 50 points. If the HHI lies 
between 1000 and 1800, the merger does not raise concerns.17 The HHI is used to 
distinguish mergers that do not raise competitive concerns from those mergers that may 
have adverse competitive effects and require further analysis.  
The Merger Guidelines identify “market power” as a benchmark for analyzing 
mergers. Market power is defined as “the ability to raise prices above those that would be 
charged in a competitive market.” Hence, the test is whether the merger would raise 
prices above competitive market price. The HHI does not provide information on price 
changes after mergers. Economists use measures of price elasticity to assess potential 
changes in price. Price elasticity is used to gauge whether the merging parties have so 
much market power such that consumers would become insensitive to price increases. 
Once a measure of price elasticity is found, it can be used to simulate post-merger price 
changes.18 This type of econometric analysis is used frequently in the US and was applied 
in the review of the Staples-Office Depot and the L’Oréal-Maybelline mergers.19 
The US agencies typically apply econometric analysis to merger review.20 Indeed, 
in the adversarial legal system of the US agencies, each side will usually employ 
                                                 
17 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization, Third Edition. New York: 
Addison-Wesley, 2000: 613. 
18 See Chapter 9 of Carlton and Perloff for an overview of simulation techniques. 
19 Werden and Froeb at the Department of Justice have been influential in developing these techniques. See, 
G.J. Werden and L.M. Froeb. “Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated 
Products Industries” in M.B. Coate and A.N. Kileit, eds. The Economics of the Antitrust Process. Boston: 
Kluwer, 1996. 
20 For a discussion of econometric techniques, see David Scheffman and Mary Coleman. “FTC 
Perspectives on the Use of Econometric Analyses in Antitrust Cases.” www.ftc.org. 
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microeconomic arguments in their testimony. The role of economic analysis and 
econometric analysis is used less in EU merger review. Most of the staff at the MTF are 
legal experts rather than economists. We expect that the use of econometric analysis will 
increase at the Commission with the upcoming appointment of a lead economist by 
Commissioner Monti.21 
The statutes governing US antitrust policy are written vaguely enough to invite 
debate among legal scholars on the objectives of antitrust law. The prevailing view is that 
the guiding principle of US antitrust law is to promote efficiency. Take the example of a 
merger that increases concentration in the market but allows the combined firm to 
produce at lower marginal costs. In this instance, it will most likely be viewed favorably 
as a merger that promotes efficiency, rather than one that reduces competition.22  
Data in Figure 2 below show the breakdown of merger cases received by the FTC 
and DoJ.  While data limitations prevent a direct comparison of prohibition decisions by 
the US agencies and the EU agencies, Figure 2 allows us to compare the number of cases 
that go on to a second request procedure, which is similar to the EU’s Phase 2.23 During 
1992-2001, the percentage of merger reviews issued second requests ranged between 
2.1% in 2000 to 4.1% in 1993. In contrast, mergers notified to the European Commission 
after 1990 enter Phase 2 more frequently. Data in Figure 1 show that the average 
percentage of cases entering Phase 2 during the September 1990 to October 2002 time 
period is approximately 5%.  
                                                 
21 Mario Monti. “Europe’s merger monitor.” The Economist, 9 November 2002. 
22 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. Modern Industrial Organization, Third Edition. New York: 
Addison-Wesley, 2000: 613. 
23 Data concerning the total number of rejected cases by US agencies is not available. 
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Figure 2 
United States Merger Review Statistics 
1992 to 2001 
 
  
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
Transactions Reported 
 
1,589 
 
1,846 
 
2,305 
 
2,816 
 
3,087 
 
3,702 
 
4,728 
 
4,642 
 
4,926 
 
2,376 
Filings Received 3,030 3,559 4,403 5,439 6,001 7,199 9,264 9,151 9,941 4,800 
        Adjusted Transactions In 
         Which A Second Request 
         Could Have Been Issued 
 
1,451 
 
1,745 
 
2,128 
 
2,612 
 
2,864 
 
3,438 
 
4,575 
 
4,340 
 
4,749 
 
2,237 
           
       Investigations in Which 
     Second Requests Were Issued 44 71 73 101 99 122 125 111 98 70 
      FTC 26 40 46 58 36 45 46 45 43 27 
           Percent 1.8% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 
      DOJ 18 31 27 43 63 77 79 68 55 43 
           Percent 1.2% 1.8% 1.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.2% 1.7% 1.6% 1.2% 1.9% 
 
Source: Federal Trade Commission Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2001, Appendix A, 
(http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsr.htm). 
 
However, the perception of greater scrutiny emerging from a comparison of EU 
and US merger review data may simply be a result of the fewer cases that are investigated 
by the European Merger Task Force each year rather than different procedures or 
economic principles. Whereas in 2001, the US agencies received 4,800 filings, the 
European Commission received only 335 notified cases. With fewer cases in the pipeline, 
it is easier for the MTF to investigate a greater percentage of cases in a Phase 2 
procedure. One must exercise caution in interpreting a simple comparison of US agencies 
and European MTF case decisions because the agencies do not review the same list of 
merger cases. Many mergers do not involve transatlantic companies and will only be 
reviewed by either the US agencies of European MTF. 
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 Different institutional arrangements on each side of the Atlantic contribute to 
uncertainty in merger decisions. For instance, the Commission has also been criticized for 
its combined responsibilities of initiating, investigating, and deciding merger cases. 
Despite these criticisms of the extended role of the Commission in merger cases, the final 
arbiter of the decision is the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
The oversight of the ECJ has recently become more significant. Between June and 
October 2002 the Court of First Instance overruled three merger decisions by DG 
Competition.  In June 2002, the Court overturned the Commission’s decision to block the 
merger of Airtours and First Choice, two British travel agencies. Using strong language 
in its opinion, the Court found that the Commission had made its decision in “manifest 
error.” In October 2002, the Court overturned the Commission’s prohibition of the 
merger between Schneider and Legrand, two French electrical equipment makers, and the 
merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel, two packaging companies. In the Tetra-Sidel case, 
the Court found the Commission’s economic analysis to be faulty.  In unusually blunt 
language, the Court said, “The economic analysis [of the merger’s anti-competitive 
effects] is based on insufficient evidence and some errors of assessment.”24 
 In contrast to the EU, merger procedures in the US involve the judicial branch of 
the government from the time of notification. Prior to a hearing, settlement negotiations 
between firms and the lead agency make take place. These meetings are designed to alter 
the terms of the merger to reduce possible anticompetitive effects.25 Parties argue their 
case before a judge in an oral hearing. The final decision lies with the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
24 Francesco Guerrera, “Court scraps Monti veto of packaging merger,” Financial Times, 25 October 2002. 
25 W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 
Third Edition. Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000: 209. 
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The FTC and DoJ determine which cases the Court will consider; however, it is unlikely 
that the agencies will bring cases to the Court which they believe they may lose.26 A 
system of public testimony in the US system is viewed as a weakness because many third 
parties to the merging companies are not prepared to testify openly against their 
competitors, suppliers, or customers.27  
Although lobbying is a standard activity at the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, it is more taboo in Brussels where senior policy officials are more 
sensitive to accusations of biased decisions. In fact, some view GE’s aggressive lobbying 
efforts in Brussels as detrimental to its merger proposal. Rather, EU competition officials 
place more importance on information from the rivals of the merging companies, relative 
to their American counterparts. Whereas complaints from competitors would be seen as 
good for competition by the US, the Europeans rely on this information due to resource 
constraints.28 
Whereas Americans view Europeans as appealing to political interests by 
protecting inefficient home firms, some view US mergers as dependent, in part, on the 
political leanings of the President in power.  For instance, the current Bush 
Administration is perceived to have appointed more pro big business staff to the FTC and 
DoJ than previous administrations.29 In the past, both parties followed an unwritten rule 
against allowing an industry with three dominant players to shrink to a duopoly. 
                                                 
26 Ibid: 210. 
27 Edward Bannerman. “The future of EU competition policy,” Center for European Reform, February 
2002: 28–29. 
28 “Navigating Brussels: How Merger Regulation Works in the EU Capital,” An American Lawyer Media 
Supplement, Winter 2002: 31. 
29 Dan Carney, “Bush’s Trustbusters Need Another Name,” Business Week, September 13, 2002. 
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However, the Bush Administration seems more willing to consider these mergers.30  In 
addition, some Europeans allege that the partisanship of the American executive 
influences the outcome of US merger decisions. Specifically, the FTC and DoJ during 
Republican administrations are seen as being more in favor of big business than during 
Democratic administrations.31 However, the contrary is not true. Having a Democrat as 
President does not guarantee that big business mergers will be rejected.  For instance, the 
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger was approved during the Clinton administration. The 
EU also approved this merger after initial misgivings about its effect on competition. 
 
V. SIMILAR ECONOMICS, DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS 
The economics of competition policy in Europe and industrial economics, as it is 
known in the United States, are based on the notion that competition is good. 
Competition leads to cost efficiency, lower prices, and technological innovation. 
Competition markets produce greater consumer welfare. 
The question for merger analysis becomes how do we recognize when a merger 
will infringe market competition? Although perfect competition is the basis of 
microeconomics, it is rarely observed in the real world. Likewise, few industries are 
characterized by a single monopolistic firm. Typically, merging companies operate in 
oligopolistic market conditions, and the process of merger review investigates whether 
                                                 
30 The proposed Echostar-DirecTV merger between two satellite broadcasters is an example. This merger 
has since been rejected by the US Federal Communications Commission. 
31 Interview with Holger Dickmann, Directorate-General Competition, European Commission, 16 October 
2000. 
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the merger will reduce effective competition and increase market power in the merged 
entity.32 
Companies in similar industries typically merge in an effort to reduce costs, for 
instance, by increasing economies of scale. In a competitive market, the benefits of 
reducing a firm’s costs would be passed on to the consumer through lower prices. 
However for some horizontal mergers, cost reductions, or “efficiency gains” can produce 
higher prices.  Figure 2 below illustrates this scenario. The illustration shows a merger 
that produces an efficiency gain in lower production costs as well as a deadweight loss in 
higher prices and less production quantity. This model was first developed by Oliver 
Williamson to compare the social costs and benefits of mergers.33  
 
                                                 
32 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker. The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Applications and 
Measurement. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999:11-45. 
33 Oliver E. Williamson, “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” American 
Economic Review, March 1968. 
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 Figure 3 
Production Efficiency vs. Market Power Harm
 $
  
F
E
Efficiency gain 
Deadweight loss
Original MC
New MC
Demand 
 1.10
 1.00
 0.90
 
Output, q 90 100
 Source: Carlton, Dennis W. and Perloff, Jeffrey M., Modern Industrial Organization, 
             Third Edition.  New York: Addison-Wesley, 2000, p. 605. 
 
 
 
 
In the scenario in Figure 2, more efficient production resulting from the merger 
cause the average marginal cost of production between the two firms to fall from one 
dollar to 90 cents. The reduction of cost results in greater productive efficiency 
represented by the shaded rectangle in Figure 2. However, price increases cause a 
deadweight loss represented by the shaded triangle in Figure 2. Before the merger, 
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competition forced the firms to price at marginal cost, point F in Figure 2. After the 
merger, market power is created, and price rises to point E. This illustration clearly shows 
how mergers can create a trade-off between efficiency gains and increased prices, 
resulting from the elimination of competition. Williamson argued that a merger is good 
for society if the triangular area, representing the deadweight loss from the price increase, 
is smaller than the rectangular area of efficiency gain.  However, the relative size of these 
two areas is hard to measure and depends on particular circumstances.   
The model in Figure 2 can be used to summarize the general differences between 
the approach of the US and EU in analyzing the effects of mergers. In general, the 
tendency in the US has been to focus more on efficiency gains, while in the EU, the 
tendency is to focus on the harmful effects of reduced competition. In Figure 2, these 
detrimental effects are price increases. While both the US and the EU try to calculate 
whether the efficiency gain outweighs the loss to competition, measures are typically 
based on inefficient data and can produce varying conclusions. 
Some Europeans would argue that the US focuses too strongly on the efficiency 
gains.34  The US argues that efficiency gains benefit the consumer. By emphasizing 
consumer benefit, US authorities follow the free market tenets of Chicago School 
economics.  The Chicago School economists hold the view that mergers inherently 
weaken competitors and strengthen the merging companies. These gains to the merging 
                                                 
34 Edward Bannerman. “The future of EU competition policy,” Center for European Reform, February 
2002: 26–27. 
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companies benefit society.  As a consequence, the more efficient merged entity squeezes 
out other competitors, who naturally will complain of anticompetitive behavior. 
 In contrast, European authorities place more weight relative to their US 
counterparts on the views of competitors and suppliers in an effort to protect consumers’ 
long-term interests.  In this way, European merger control aims to ensure that markets 
remain sufficiently competitive in the long run, such that consumers may benefit from 
choice, innovation, and competitive prices. For instance, a more efficient concentration 
may, at first, pass on cost savings to customers by reducing prices and, in doing so, 
acquire dominant market power. The European concern is that the merged entity would 
then be able to abuse its market dominance by raising prices once relevant competition 
has been pushed out of the market.  Increased prices could reach oligopolistic levels. 
While this concern has earned the EU criticism for putting the interests of competitors 
ahead of consumers, it is clear that in this scenario consumers are hurt in the long run. 
The link between competition and consumer benefit is aptly summarized by Mario 
Monti, the European Commissioner for Competition Policy:  
 
Somebody must check that a merger does not result in excessive market 
power and thus ensure that consumers will continue to benefit from a 
competitive environment in terms of innovation, quality, choice and prices 
(Mario Monti, A Global Competition Policy? European Competition Day, 
Copenhagen, 17 September 2002). 
 
VI. DIFFERENT TESTS 
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 In addition to this different perception of the potential for mergers to have 
anticompetitive effects, the US and EU differ on specific techniques used to analyze 
mergers. One such example is the debate between the use of the “dominance test” by the 
European authorities versus the “substantial lessening of competition” test by American 
authorities. The difference comes directly from the text governing each authority’s 
antitrust laws. In the EU, where the law governing merger control was drafted in 1990, 
mergers must be declared unlawful where they “create or strengthen a dominant 
position.” In the US, according to a statute from 1914, mergers are not allowed if they 
result in “a substantial lessening of competition” (speech by Mario Monti to the 
American Bar Association, 14 November 2001).  
 One critique of the dominance test currently used by the Commission is that it is 
“all or nothing.” Either the merger would give the new entity market dominance or not. 
Under the substantial lessening evaluation, proposed mergers that might appear to lessen 
competition would have the opportunities to make a case for increased efficiencies 
resulting from the merger. Although some international attorneys propose that the EU 
also adopt the substantial lessening of competition (SLC) test to harmonize practices with 
the US, Commissioner Monti does not have immediate plans to adopt this reform (Speech 
at DG Competition/International Bar Association Conference on EU Merger Control, 
Brussels, 7-8 November 2002). 
 The debate between the use of SLC and dominance tests reflect differences in 
reviewing horizontal mergers. However, the EU and US antitrust authorities also diverge 
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in some instances of vertical mergers. The most recent and well-publicized example is the 
GE-Honeywell merger. 
The Commission believes that if a merger between companies of different 
industries gives the entity “portfolio power,” the deal may be harmful to competition. 
Portfolio power is the ability to bundle a broad range of related products. The bundling 
argument was first used in the EU’s scrutiny of the GE-Honeywell deal. The Commission 
claimed that GE could tie sales of aircraft engines and avionics from Honeywell into cut-
price bundles that would drive out competitors. When GE attacked this line of argument, 
the Commission argued that GE-Honeywell would be too “influential” in the market for 
aircraft engines and systems. Consequently, the Commission called for the sale of parts 
of Honeywell’s avionics business as well as modifying the business of GE’s aircraft 
leasing division, GE-CAS. 
Another example of the EU’s application of tying arguments includes the merger 
between Grand Metropolitan and Guinness to create Diageo Plc, the world’s largest 
liquor company. The EU believed that by bundling their broad range of drink products, 
from whiskey to champagne, the merged giant could put pressure on distributors to buy 
more of their products.  
 
VII. SIMILAR OUTCOMES IN MERGER DECISIONS 
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Despite the publicity surrounding conflicting decisions in the US and Europe, in 
fact, differences are rare. As in other areas of commercial and trade policy, the US and 
EU confer extensively on issues related to antitrust and competition. According to Monti, 
“The EU and US see eye to eye on virtually all aspects of antitrust and merger policy.”35 
Both sides have considered the idea of creating a global competition forum. Indeed, since 
the controversial Boeing-McDonnell Douglas decision in which the European 
Commission came close to opposing the merger, the US and EU regulatory authorities 
have initiated more transatlantic dialogue.  
In 1991 the US and the EU concluded a cooperation agreement regarding merger 
policy. This agreement imposes obligations on American and European competition 
authorities to notify each other when its enforcement activities may impact the activities 
of the other. The US and EU also agreed to exchange information, to cooperate in the 
enforcement of each other’s competition rules and to consider each other’s important 
interests.36 A working group has recently been established to evaluate differences and 
similarities between EU and US competition rules with representation from DG 
Competition, the Antitrust division of the US Department of Justice, and US Federal 
Trade Commission. On 30 October 2002 the EU and US competition authorities issued 
an overview of best practice guidelines by which both sides would abide. The main 
elements of this overview involve coordinating collection and evaluation of evidence. In 
addition, both sides would coordinate investigation timetables, increase communication 
                                                 
35 Speech by Mario Monti to the American Bar Association, 14 November 2001. 
36 Alison Jones and Sufrin, Brenda. EC Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
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between the respective agencies, and ensure consistency between contingency remedies 
for merger approval37 
While disagreements between US and EU merger authorities remain few, 
conflicting decisions typically involve high-profile cases, thus receiving a lot of media 
attention. The GE-Honeywell case is only the second time that the Commission has 
vetoed the merger of only American companies. The first was the MCI WorldCom-Sprint 
merger. According to the Commission, a merger between MCI WorldCom and Sprint 
would have resulted in the creation of a dominant position in the market for top-level 
universal Internet connectivity. The companies proposed to divest Sprint’s Internet 
business but this was considered insufficient by the Commission to resolve competition 
concerns.38 It is no coincidence that US competition authorities also did not approve the 
merger. The Department of Justice found that competition would suffer if it allowed a 
move from three major long distance telecommunications firms to two.39  
The perception that EU merger authorities always take a more negative position 
than US counterparts is incorrect. Indeed, the US has blocked mergers that had been 
approved by the European Commission. In 2000, the US blocked the takeover of BOC by 
Air Liquide/Air Products, despite EU approval.  
 
VII. CURRENT EUROPEAN REFORMS 
Commissioner Monti has recently announced reforms of the European antitrust 
procedures which aim to increase transparency and consistency as well as improve the 
                                                 
37 Commission Press Room, “EU and US issue best practices concerning bilateral cooperation in merger 
cases,” 30 October 2002. 
38 European Commission, “Commission prohibits merger between MCI WorldCom and Sprint,” press 
release, 28 June 2000. 
39 The Economist, “Disconnected,” June 29 2000. 
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decision making process of merger review. He has called for the appointment of a chief 
economist who would be seconded to the Commission to give leadership to the review 
process. This person would be abreast of the latest economic thinking in the field of 
industrial organization. In addition, he has proposed a systematic peer review panel 
which would be independent from the Merger Task Force. The panel would review the 
analysis at key points during the investigation of the merger review. As an independent 
panel, this new body would add “checks” to the current merger review procedure.40  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper argues that while objectives as well as procedures and institutions 
concerning merger decisions in the US and the EU differ, in practice merger decisions 
regarding companies operating in both jurisdictions are typically the same. A highly 
publicized exception was the European Commission’s overruling of the GE-Honeywell 
merger which had already been approved in the US.  
We draw the following lessons for US firms seeking a merger involving the EU:  
 
1. When preparing a merger proposal in the US, merging firms may be 
well advised to consult simultaneously with EU authorities to avoid 
unpleasant surprises in the future. 
 
2. US firms may be advised to cooperate very closely with the 
Commission given the latter’s substantial decision-making power. In 
contrast to merger decisions in the US which uses a adversarial legal 
approach to merger decisions, the European Commission initiates, 
                                                 
40 Mario Monti. “Europe’s merger monitor.” The Economist, 9 November 2002. 
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investigates and decides merger cases. Thus, the FTC and DoJ may be 
subjected to more oversight than the European Commission. However, 
recent developments in the EU indicate that this difference may have 
become diminished. The annulment by the European Court of First 
Instance of the Commission’s prohibition decision regarding the 
Schneider-Legrand and Tetra Laval-Sidel mergers could indicate that 
in the near future DG Competition will find it more difficult to say no. 
 
3. US firms should be careful when lobbying in Brussels. The more 
aggressive lobby-style in the US comes across as less persuasive in 
Brussels. 
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